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PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION-
A NEW APPROACH TO HEARSAY EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Every state except Idaho has either statutory or constitutional lan-
guage reflecting the sixth amendment's right to confrontation.2  A result
similar to that required by the Constitution is provided by the common-
law hearsay evidence rule, which prohibits the admission of evidence which
the declarant has not given directly at trial and upon which he cannot be
cross-examined However, the hearsay rule has been qualified by a
number of specific exceptions developed by the courts and legislatures
over the last two hundred years 4 Perhaps because of the similarities in
result between the two rules, the courts have generally held that the right
to confrontation is not violated by the admission of out-of-court statements
which fit within one of the established exceptions to the hearsay rule.5
However, recent developments in the law of hearsay suggest a need to
reconsider whether the delimitation of the constitutional right can be
relegated solely to the minimally acceptable degrees of trustworthiness
controlling the admission of hearsay.
I U. S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
2 See 5 WIGMoRE, EviDENcE § 1397, at 127 n.1 (Supp. 1962) for the various
state provisions. Added to this list should be ALASKA CoNsT. art. I § 11 (accused
has right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him"). Idaho's protection
must rest on the due process clause of her constitution. Several states use the lan-
guage "to meet witnesses face to face." See, e.g., State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan,
201 Ore. 163, 269 P.2d 491 (1954) (this phrase forces the state to produce wit-
nesses for the accused). Compare State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696
(1960).
The protection afforded by a statutory confrontation clause is obviously de-
pendent on the whims of the legislatures. Compare People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246,
267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954) (hearsay admissible under CAL.
PENAL CODE § 646 does not violate statutory confrontation guarantee), with People v.
Nisonoff, 293 N.Y. 597, 59 N.E.2d 420 (1944) (autopsy report-admissible under
prior statutory guarantee-held no violation of recently adopted constitutional
guarantee).
8 See Dysart Peerage Case, 6 App. Cas. 489, 503-04 (1881). See generally
9 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY oF ENGLISHi LAw 214-19 (3d ed. 1944); McCoRMicx,
EVmENCE §§ 223-25 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRmIcK].
4 See generally 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-26 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE].
5 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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The most significant development in the law of hearsay is the Uniform
Rules of Evidence.6 In order to effectuate the general policy of admission
of all probative evidence, the Commissioners on the Uniform Rules have
significantly expanded many of the exceptions to the general rule.7  The
Rules enlarge the concept of admissible hearsay to include, for example,
evaluative official reports, declarations against penal interest, a co-con-
spirator's statement if only relevant to the conspiracy, and admission of a
prior felony judgment to show any fact necessary for that judgment. More-
over, the Uniform Rules eliminate for some exceptions the common-law
requirement of unavailability of the declarant.
Unfortunately, although the Commissioners were aware of particular
constitutional objections,8 they did not formulate their proposed exceptions
to meet them. However, the studies made by several states considering
the adoption of the Uniform Rules 9 show a consciousness of the constitu-
tionally permissible limits of hearsay exceptions.", This Note will attempt
to establish standards for a viable interpretation of the confrontation clause,
examine the historical interrelationship between the right to confrontation
and the hearsay rule, and will propose an analytical approach to be applied
to offered hearsay to preserve this constitutional protection.
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The constitutional guarantee of confrontation is by no means free
from ambiguity, for the words could be read as simply insuring to the
accused the right to be present when a witness is giving damaging testi-
mony. This reading would be consistent with the suggestion that a prime
reason for the inclusion of the clause was probably the fear of ex parte
6 Suggestions for reformation of evidentiary rules long antedated the Uniform
Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., 5 WIGMoRE §§ 1368-1400; Chadbourn, Bentham and the
Hearsay Rule-A Benthainic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, 75 HARv. L. REv. 932 (1962); Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WAsH. L.
REv. 1 (1937).
7 See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 7. Compare MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
503(a) (1942) (the Code was not adopted by any jurisdiction).
8 UNiFoRM RULE OF EVIDENCE, prefatory note, at 163; UNIFORM Ru=m OF EVI-
DENCE 7, comment
9 Kansas, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone have incorporated
the Uniform Rules in their system of laws. The New Jersey Supreme Court has
adopted a modified version of the Rules, effective June 1, 1965, unless revised by
the legislature. In addition to the above jurisdictions, California, Washington, Utah,
and Oklahoma have conducted studies on adopting the Rules. Letter from Francis
D. Jones, Executive Secretary, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Sept 23, 1964, on file
in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
10 See 4 CAL. LAw REVISION COmm. REP RTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SrTm s
450 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CA1.. STUDY]. N.J. SUPREME CotR COMM. oN
EVIDENCE, REPORT 142-52, 192 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 N.J. REPORT];
UTAH SUPREME COURT COmm. ON UNIFORM RULEs OF EVIDENCE rule 63(3), com-
ment (Final Draft 1959) [hereinafter cited as UTAH STunY].
Compare Chadbourn, supra note 6; McKay, The Right to Confrontation, 1959
WAs H. U.L.Q. 122; Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity, and the Uniform Rules:
A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204 (1960).
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
or star chamber proceedings."1 In fact some jurisdictions hold that the
guarantee is satisfied as long as the prosecution presents a witness-
whether the declarant or not.'2 However, "confront" connotes more of an
active participation by the defendant with the witnesses and thus can
reasonably be read as including an opportunity to cross-examine.' 3 "Wit-
nesses" similarly must mean the declarants, rather than any witnesses who
recount what the declarants or original documents said. If the sixth
amendment were construed not to require the production of the declarant
of the damaging statement, the accused's right of cross-examination would
then be emasculated.
A certain notion of fairness has already pervaded the courts' general
treatment of evidence in criminal trials.' 4 It arguably follows that the due
process clause could effectively prevent the patent abuses in admitting
hearsay statements. However, to suggest that the accused is sufficiently
protected by the due process clause would be to regard the confrontation
clause merely as a constitutional anachronism.' 5 Although the available
documentary history of the Bill of Rights provides no determinative guide-
lines for the ongoing reinterpretation of the clause,16 it must be assumed
"1 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); Dowdell v. United
States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242
(1895); State v. Waldron, 16 RI. 191, 14 Atl. 847 (1888). Compare People v.
Dolgin, 415 Ill. 434, 450, 114 N.E.2d 389, 397 (1953), in which the court held that
the accused has no vested rights in rules of evidence, and no constitutional objec-
tion will be heard in a criminal trial unless accused has had no "fair opportunity
to make a defense and to submit facts to the jury!'
.Ex parte proceedings no longer represent a serious threat to the individual, for
constitutional protection against them has been recognized. Cf. In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948).
12 See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 16 RI. 528, 533 (1889).
13 See WmSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcONixARY 477 (3d ed. 1964) ("to stand
facing or opposing, esp. in challenge, defiance, or accusation").
14 See, e.g., United States v. De Sisto, 329 Fl2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 979 (1964); People v. Crump, 5 Ill. 2d 251, 268, 125 N.E.2d 615, 624
(1955); People v. Timmons, 300 Mich. 653, 660, 2 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1942) (con-
curring opinion); cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945).
15 The accused can be protected from ex parte hearings by the speedy-and-public
trial provision of the sixth amendment. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267-68
(1948).
Courts have at times indicated that against which the confrontation clause does
not protect. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1955) (hearsay
before a grand jury); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 375 (1911) (names
of witnesses before a grand jury); Green v. Bomar, 329 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1964)
(right to examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing in a state capital offense
proceeding); United States v. Johnson, 129 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1942) (exclusion of
defendant from courtroom during argument on question of law); Curtis v. Rives,
123 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (failure of Government to produce certain key wit-
nesses) ; cf., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (refusal to take defendant
with the jury when it went to view the scene of the crime); Hutson v. State, 296
S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956) (impeachment of defendant's witness by tape
recording).
16 The standard collections of constitutional documents were consulted. E.g.,
1-5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1861); FARRADm, THE
REcoRDs OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 (1911); THE FEDERALIST PAPERS. See also
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LinTTATioNs *318 (4th ed. 1878).
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that all the words of the Constitution have a real present meaning unless
otherwise proven.17 The strength of the language of the clause as reason-
ably interpreted and the fact that courts have consistently given it objective
content by interpreting it in light of the hearsay rule 18 make such an
assumption reasonable.
A. Federal Standards for the Right to Confrontation
The Supreme Court has said that the confrontation clause includes
important rights to the individual, which the Court "has been zealous to
protect . . . from erosion." 19 However, the Supreme Court has never
fully articulated federal standards required by the confrontation clause in
a hearsay evidence context.20 Dicta in several cases further confuse any
attempt to discern a definite federal standard. In one case Mr. Justice
Cardozo recognized that "the privilege of confrontation at [no] time [has]
been without recognized exceptions. . . . The exceptions are not even
static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material depar-
ture from the reason of the general rule." 21 Unfortunately he provided
no indication of what the "reason of the general rule" was. In another
case the Court stated that the purpose of the confrontation clause is to
"continue and preserve" the right to confrontation as it existed at common
law and "not to broaden it or disturb the exceptions." 22
Moreover, the Supreme Court has rarely been called upon to decide
whether the right to confrontation will be extended to specific factual
situations. In one of the earliest cases to reach the Court, it held that
where the Government negligently allowed a witness to flee, the witness'
testimony from a preliminary hearing could not be admitted at trial because
of the sixth amendment's requirement.23 And the Court later held that
the admission of the trial record of a defendant's alleged accomplices to
17 See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 587-88 (1938); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926);
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
38 See, e.g., Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926); Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 610
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963); cf. Brown v. United States, 234 F.2d
140 (6th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
19 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 (1959).
20 Compare Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (dictum).
21 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934).
22 Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926). Compare Kay v. United
States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958), in which the
court stated that the clause was "intended to prevent the trial of criminal cases
upon affidavits, not to serve as a rigid and inflexible barrier against the orderly
development of reasonable and necessary exceptions to the hearsay rule"
2Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). Compare Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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show that property was in fact stolen from the United States violated the
confrontation guarantee.24
If any federal standard can profitably be distilled from the few cases
squarely presenting the issue, that standard would be that the right to
confrontation gives a criminal defendant the opportunity to face and
effectively 2 cross-examine the witnesses who are testifying against him.26
The extent to which these witnesses can be other than the original declarant
depends upon whether the historically evolved exceptions to the hear-
say evidence rule provide constitutionally adequate protection for the
defendant.
2 7
24 Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899). The Court has also side-
stepped a real constitutional discussion by finding that the evidence objected to was
not hearsay, and thus no confrontation was necessary. Salinger v. United States,
272 U.S. 542 (1926) (letters written by third parties were answered by the defendant
and thus adopted by him); Dowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (certifi-
cation of facts by the judge and clerk on how a trial was conducted).
2 5 See Garcia v. State, 210 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) (failure to
provide translator when defendant could not understand English violated state con-
frontation clause) ; accord, State v. Vasque, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903 (1942).
.26But a fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot
be proved against an accused . . . except by witnesses who confront him at
the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled
to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode
authorized by the established rules governing the trial nr conduct of criminal
cases.
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
27 The Supreme Court has rejected application of the confrontation clause to
the states. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ; West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904). The states
have also consistently accepted this view. See, e.g., People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d
246, 267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1958). Compare In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948) ; Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353 (1852).
In Stein v. New York, supra, the Court affirmed a conspiracy conviction which
had been based in part upon the confessions of two co-conspirators which implicated
the petitioner. The Court stated that the "hearsay-evidence rule, with all its subtleties,
anomolies and ramifications, will not be read into the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
at 176. However, the Court recently has shown an increasing tendency to protect
individuals against state action by means of federal standards. See, e.g., Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The right to cross-examine the opposing witnesses may
perhaps be considered a liberty so basic that such protection is required. See Kirby
v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 56 (1898) ; United States ex rel. Jones v. Myers, 226
F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (dictum). Compare United States v. Rosenberg,
195 F.2d 583, 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952) (hearsay admitted
without objection is to be given its natural probative effect on appeal), with United
States v. Dunn, 299 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1962) (even though not objected to, hearsay
which provides sole grounds for conviction will be considered error under FED. R.
Cam. P. 52(b)). See generally ANTIEAU, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 181 (1960).
Recently, a federal district court in Gray v. Wilson, 230 F. Supp. 860, 862 (S.D.
Cal. 1964), held that "the right of the accused to cross-examine and confront prose-
cution witnesses in a state criminal trial is guaranteed by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." The Government had offered only a transcript of the
preliminary hearing into evidence, claiming that the defendant waived his right to
confrontation when he waived a jury trial. The court found no specific waiver and
thus granted habeas corpus. However, the court apparently used the notion of fair-
ness in due process instead of the confrontation clause to reach this conclusion, for
it felt compelled by Wilner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), which
held that a lawyer was guaranteed the right to cross-examine those who testified
against him in a state administrative proceeding.
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B. The Hearsay Rule and the Right to Confrontation
1. Historical Interrelationship
Although the language of the confrontation clause is absolute, it has
always been interpreted as admitting some exceptions in the hearsay
context.28 The framers may not have intended to establish the hearsay
rule itself as the fundamental value of the right to confrontation, but it is
reasonable to infer that they were willing to accept the then existing
exceptions to the rule as permissible trial practices. However, the assump-
tion that only those hearsay exceptions which existed at the time of the
sixth amendment's adoption are constitutional 29 seems without merit.
Exceptions to the common-law hearsay rule were devised almost concur-
rently with the statement of the rule because of a realization that justice
otherwise would be defeated. 0 But the established exceptions had gone
through a gradual and at times confusing development by the 1790's, and
others were still in the process of being refined.31 To create a constitutional
2 8 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). For some early
state decisions in this area, see State v. Mc O'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402 (1857) ; Summons
v. State, 5 Ohio St. 325 (1856).
2 9 Compare note 27, supra; note 31 infra.
80 See generally 9 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. sispra note 3, at 219; 5 WiGmoRE § 1397,
at 130.
3 1 Perhaps motivated by the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted on
hearsay evidence, the English courts developed a strong policy against the admission
of hearsay by the 1700's. See generally HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951) ;
5 WIGmoRE § 1364, at 21, 24. The courts almost concurrently developed a few
exceptions-Wigmore's treatise provides an excellent historical survey. Id. §§ 1430,
1476. Compare Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MicHa. L. Rv. 1159, 1161-63 (1954)
(conspiracy exception did not develop till 1794-96). But the courts gave ground
grudgingly thereafter when new exceptions were posed. See Sussex Peerage Case,
[1844] 11 Cl. & F. 85, 109-14, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1043-46; Berkeley Peerage Case,
[1811] 4 Camp. 401, 171 Eng. Rep. 128. Some of the early exceptions grew out of
the necessity caused by the lack of adequate registry systems, id. at 421, 171 Eng.
Rep. at 137; and thus the only way to establish some points of pedigree and boundary
was by hearsay through, for example, family bibles or common knowledge. See
generally 5 WiGmoRE §§ 1480 (pedigree), 1563 (boundaries). Compare Mima Queen
v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813). Since all states now have recording
statutes for land and for vital statistics, it might be questioned whether the necessity
argument used to justify the admission of this evidence is still valid. See generally
Note, 46 IowA L. REV. 414 (1961). In any event no criminal case could be found
in which the exception of pedigree or boundary was used.
The English courts initially received book entries only when made by persons
who had died and did not receive the party's own entries even though the party
could not have testified himself at trial. See generally 5 WIGM RE §§ 1476, 1518.
Because of this quirk in the early procedure, the party's books were eventually ad-
mitted. However, when the parties were finally permitted to testify, the exception
was continued. Id. § 1518, at 350.
The dying declaration exception was initially accepted in both criminal and civil
trials. Wright v. Littler, [1761] 3 Burr. 1244, 1253. However, by the American
Revolution, the English courts had apparently restricted it only to homicide cases.
Stobart v. Dryden, [1836] 1 M. & W. 614, 150 Eng. Rep. 581. But see 5 WiGmoRE
§ 1431, at 220. Moreover, some exceptions did not actually congeal until the nine-
teenth century. Statements against interest were not mentioned in this early period.
Spontaneous utterances were not mentioned specifically, but were hinted at in dis-
cussions about other exceptions as to the likelihood of reliability being increased as
a statement nears the event Berkeley Peerage Case, supra at 408, 171 Eng. Rep. at
131; Rawson v. Haigh, [1824] 2 Bing. 99, 103, 130 Eng. Rep. 242, 244. And the law on
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rule based on an arbitrary date when the law was quite unclear would
seem to run counter to the notion of a gradual constitutional reevaluation
in light of society's present attitudes.3 2 Similarly, even if the framers
actually considered the exceptions existing in 1791, it does not follow
inexorably that the original exceptions are still constitutional.
It has also been suggested that the framers merely meant to place the
complete abolition of the hearsay rule beyond the power of legislatures.33
Although the clause, as so interpreted, apparently would not require
standards for the admission of specific hearsay, legislatures could easily
undermine the entire effectiveness of the hearsay rule by enacting very
liberal exceptions.3 4  This possibility demonstrates that a constitutional
evaluation of each exception is necessary to preserve the basic right.
Both the right to confrontation and the hearsay rule reflect the belief
that some evidence which might be of probative value should not be
admitted unless the declarant has actually appeared in court and has been
cross-examined with regard to his sincerity, memory, perception, and
ability to communicate.3 5 When courts have admitted hearsay in criminal
trials, they have generally attempted only to fit the evidence within one of
the established common-law hearsay exceptions which have developed
because of a certain notion of potential trustworthiness, or because of
necessity.3 6 However, the purpose of the common-law exceptions appears
to be to facilitate the admission of probative evidence.3 7 These exceptions
have evolved from a weighing of the need to receive the evidence at trial,
the unavailability of the declarant, the assumed trustworthiness of the
statement, and the risk that the jury will not properly assess the weight
to be given to the statement. But in a criminal trial, these considerations
must be balanced in light of the requirement of the sixth amendment, which
has as its prime goal the protection at trial of an accused faced with the
possibility of criminal sanctions.
testimony taken at prior proceedings was similarly unsettled by the 1790's. In Rex
v. Eriswell, [1790] 3 T.R. 707, 722, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 823, a court upheld the ad-
missibility of testimony of a then deceased declarant who had testified at a coroner's
inquest at which the defendant was not present, for the judicial proceeding itself
assured the trustworthiness. Although this was a civil case, Rex v. Baker, [1746]
2 Strange 1240, 93 Eng. Rep. 1156, was a criminal case with a similar holding.
Accord, Rex v. Westbeer, [1739] 1 Leach 12, 168 Eng. Rep. 108 (deposition without
defendant's cross-examination). However, in subsequent cases the courts excluded
such former testimony unless the defendant had been present at the first proceeding
and had a chance to cross-examine the witness. See, e.g., Rex v. Vipont, [1761]
2 Burr. 1163, 97 Eng. Rep. 767.
32 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); Barton v. United
States, 263 F.2d 894, 898 n.6 (5th Cir. 1959). See generally Miller, Notes on the
Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31 GE0. WASH. L. REV. 881 (1963).
33 See 5 WIGmORE § 1397, at 127.
34 See Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1954).
35 See generally MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 167-68
(4th ed. 1957).
3 6 See, e.g., Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 148 N.E.2d 879, 171 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1958).
But cf. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397 (5th Cir.
1961). See generally 5 WGmoRE §§ 1421-23.
3 7 See generally McCo. micK § 300.
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2. Constitutional Standards for Hearsay Exceptions
The trial judge in a criminal case should admit hearsay statements
only if the defendant is afforded an adequate substitute for confrontation.
38
The importance of the offered evidence to the litigation, which may be a
consideration in civil trials where the courts must finally assess liability for
loss, is of no relevance in criminal cases, where the presumption of inno-
cence protects the accused throughout the trial. Moreover, the critical
nature of a criminal trial demands that a stricter assurance of trustworthi-
ness and a stricter finding of necessity be established.39
In the establishment of potential trustworthiness, the mere assumption
that a situation minimizes the chance of falsification 4 is not sufficient.
Judges may properly consider the rationales of the established exceptions,
but should not be bound by them. They should particularly not rely
inflexibly upon categories based upon assumptions which may be reasonably
challenged by objective or psychological tests 41 or upon values which are
no longer dominant in our society. And a careful determination of neces-
sity will also insure that apparently trustworthy hearsay will not be admitted
when the original declarant could be easily produced.
Finally, the courts must weigh the importance to the defendant of
cross-examination of the declarant on the hearsay statement. When the
witness is present at trial, the defendant can force him to clarify ambiguities
and explain contradictions in his testimony, while the jury is able to observe
his demeanor as a factor in assessing credibility. The defendant should
not be denied this opportunity unless the issues that would be probed on
cross-examination are not generally significant in the trier of the fact's
evaluation of the particular evidence. Although issues of credibility are
not generally grounds for exclusion of hearsay statements, they are of prime
importance in criminal trials because of the greater reluctance to risk
misuse by the jury.
However, if the accused has a reasonable opportunity effectively to
rebut the effect of the hearsay, and if the likelihood of an inaccurate report
of the facts seems slight, hearsay can be admitted without violating the
accused's rights.4 Although courts have always been reluctant to admit
offered hearsay which did not fall within any of the traditional categories,
43
this reaction is not constitutionally compelled where the court satisfies
38 There can never be a fully adequate substitute for cross-examination, for there
is always the possibility that under effective cross-examination a witness will demon-
strate to the jury his unsuredness or mendacity.
39 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) ; Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47, 56, 60 (1899) ; cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953).
40 See text accompanying notes 46-50 infra.
41 See Quick, supra note 10, at 210.
42 Compare fattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
43 See, e.g., Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 148 N.E.2d 879, 171 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1958).
Compare United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (recog-
nizing trend toward greater admissibility of hearsay in federal courts).
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itself that the high standards of trustworthiness and necessity and the
reasonable assurance that cross-examination would be unavailing have been
met.
IlL. THFE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL TImALs
In many instances the innovations of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
have relieved the restrictive effect of traditional hearsay exceptions. This
sudden development necessitates constitutional analysis not only of the
expanded exceptions, but also of the traditional rationales of admissibility.
A. Dying Declarations
The dying declaration exception generally permits the admission of
statements of a homicide victim pertaining to the crime if the declarant
was aware of imminent death-a mental state which is thought to supply
the assurances of trustworthiness.4 The exception has existed almost as
long as the hearsay rule itself.45 Apparently, most American courts have
assumed, in effect, the propriety of this exception either with no real
discussion of trustworthiness or with a reliance on the notion that one
could not die with a lie on his lips; 46 other courts have stressed only the
element of necessity.47 However, the constitutionality of this exception
depends primarily upon the validity of the assumption that the consciousness
of impending death compels men to tell the truth.
The assumption that a man could not face the unknown of death with
a deceit on his mind was made apparently by good and religious men and
gives no credit to the scoundrel or bumbler who seeks revenge or is
mistaken even in death.48 It is unlikely that the moments before death
will ever be fully catalogued so that the world knows what goes on in a
man's mind. Although it may appear overly skeptical to question a rule
based primarily upon a fundamental religious belief in an after-life, the
Constitution would seem to require a more objective test of trustworthiness.
Notwithstanding the undoubted recognition of this exception by the
framers, the existence of a more secular society raises a reasonable doubt
whether the declarant felt compelled to speak the truth, a doubt which
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. Moreover, when a man is
44 See generally McCoRmIcK § 260; 5 WIGMORE § 1445; Falknor, The Hearsay
Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 43, 67 (1954). The declarant must
also be competent to testify were he alive.
45 See note 31 supra.
46 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) ; Tracey v. State, 97
Ill. 101, 106 (1880).
47 See, e.g., Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1896); Donnelly v.
State, 26 N.J.L. 601, 617 (1857). Several other courts have confused the area with
a res gestae discussion. See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 676, 704, 109
S.E. 201, 211 (1921).
48 See Quick, Some Reflections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L.J. 109, 112
(1960).
1965]
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near death, his excited state of mind, as well as his physical transformation,
may dull his ability to perceive facts and to relate them accurately.4 9
Notwithstanding these insurmountable objections, all courts, including
the Supreme Court, which have considered the point have assumed the
constitutionality of this exception. 50 However, the Court has never been
forced to make such a specific holding,51 and it expressed great skepticism
about the trustworthiness of dying declarations while holding that the
common law would permit a defendant to introduce rebuttal evidence.52
In an attempt to reach a compromise, some courts have indicated that a
dying declaration, if uncorroborated, may not sustain a conviction.5 3 How-
ever, this would seem to weaken the necessity justification, which attempts
to prevent a guilty defendant from benefiting from the death of the only
witness. Other courts treat rebuttal evidence that the declarant was not
a religious man as only affecting the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility.5 But this approach seems manifestly erroneous, even if
the underlying assumption of the exception is held constitutionally adequate,
because substantial evidence of the declarant's lack of religious belief would
destroy the rationale for trustworthiness.
Despite the unreliability of dying declarations, the Uniform Rules
adopted this exception without constitutional discussion.5 In fact the
New Jersey and California studies treat its trustworthiness as a foregone
conclusion. However, the Utah study-in what must be an attempt to
increase the assurances of reliability-proposed a requirement that the
judge find that "the declarant . . . had an adequate opportunity to per-
ceive the event or condition which his statement narrates, describes or
explains." 56  Although this requirement would not seem to demand an
investigation of the declarant's coherence at the time of the statement or of
the existence of a bias against the defendant, it is an enlightened first step
49 See text accompanying note 62 infra. Perhaps a determination of the nature
of the decedent's wound or cause of death should be made. Compare State v.
Stewart, 30 N.M. 227, 236, 231 Pac. 692, 696 (1924).
5 0 See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353 (1852); Summons v. State, 5 Ohio
St. 325 (1856) ; State v. Saunders, 14 Ore. 300, 12 Pac. 441 (1886) ; Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (dictum); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895) (dictum); cf. People v. Corey, 157 N.Y. 332, 51 N.E. 1024 (1898) (statutory
confrontation provision).
51 But see 5 WIxGmom § 1398, at 141.
52 Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1896).
53 See Hill v. State, 64 Miss. 431 (1886) (dictum) ; Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss.
322 (1852) (by implication). Compare Goodall v. State, 1 Ore. 335 (1861).
5 See Nesbit v. State, 43 Ga. 238, 249 (1871) ; People v. Abella, 47 Phil. I. 731
(1925). Courts will also allow evidence of passion, hatred, or revenge. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 128 At. 87 (1925) (the declarant even
made inconsistent statements-but both were admissible).
5 5 
UNIFORm RuLtE or EVIDENcE 63(5) : "[flf the judge finds that [the declaration]
was made voluntarily and in good faith and while the declarant was conscious
of his impending death and believed there was no hope of his recovery." Accord,
Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 60-460(e).
56 See UTAH STUDY 36.
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
in searching for a more rational basis for admission than ancient
assumptions.
The Uniform Rules also extended the dying declaration exception to
civil trials, because it had been illogically applied only to homicide cases.57
Conceding the illogicality of the prior restriction, it is unfortunate that the
Uniform Rules would extend and perpetuate the use of an exception of
such questionable reliability. Somewhat inexplicably, New Jersey re-
stricted the exception's use to any criminal case. s Since the basis of
trustworthiness is equally doubtful whether the trial is criminal or civil,
this partially illogical limitation seems to be based upon an extension of the
common-law necessity rationale that a wrongdoer may have removed one
of the key witnesses.
B. Excited Utterances
Another exception which is also based upon the assumption that one
in an excited state of mind is incapable of premeditation to serve his own
interests is that of excited utterances. 59 The specific requirements of the
exception all relate to the spontaneity of the statement-it must be made
while nervous excitement dominates, and it must relate to the startling
occurrences which the declarant observed personally.60 Even if it is
assumed that excitement prevents a deliberate misstatement,6 1 the pre-
requisites for admission under this exception offer constitutionally inade-
quate protection for the accused.
Psychological studies indicate that excitement may severely impair
the declarant's ability accurately to perceive and communicate.6 2 Although
these factors generally go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of
trial testimony, they assume greater importance in the hearsay context.
When an eye-witness testifies at trial, the defendant's most valuable weapon
is the opportunity to probe the witness' subjective abilities so that the
jury may consider his responses and demeanor in assessing the credibility
of his testimony. It is this opportunity that the right to confrontation
seeks to preserve, and it is this opportunity for which an adequate sub-
stitute must be provided. And since the eye-witness' ability to perceive
accurately is most often as important as his sincerity in asserting the
67 See generally 5 WIGmoRE §§ 1432, 1436; CAL. STuDY 472.
58The New Jersey recommendations had suggested that dying declarations be
admitted in civil trials under the rationale of rule 63(4) (c). See 1963 N.J. RFPORT
153; text accompanying note 177 infra.
59 See, e.g., Dismukes v. State, 83 Ala. 287 (1887). See generally 6 WiGmoRE
§ 1745.
60 See Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IowA L. REv.
224, 242 (1961). Compare Clark v. Van Vleck, 135 Iowa 194, 112 N.W. 648 (1907)
(excluded because not sufficiently spontaneous).
(11 See generally 6 WiGmoR § 1749; Slough, supra note 60, at 240.
62 See Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28
CoLum. L. Rv. 432 (1928). See also Kubie, Implications for Legal Procedure
of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 59 (1959).
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facts when the testimony is weighed, there would seem to be no adequate
substitute for having the witness make his assertions in person.
Where the declarant's statement is ambiguous or made under circum-
stances which raise a reasonable doubt as to his perceptive abilities, such
as temporary incoherency caused by the event, 8 the evidence should be
excluded. Similarly, if the defendant introduces evidence calling into
question the credibility of the statement, the prosecution should have the
burden of persuading the judge that cross-examination of the declarant on
this issue would not be of significant importance. However, if the judge
finds that the statement is unambiguous and was made while the declarant's
powers of perception and communication were unimpaired, then it may
constitutionally be admitted.
The Uniform Rules' spontaneous and contemporaneous statement
exception would admit statements which the judge finds were "made while
the declarant was under the stress of a nervous excitement caused by
[the] perception [of an event]." The common-law requirement of
unavailability was eliminated, apparently on the notion that an excited
utterance is "far superior to an in-court statement tested by cross-
examination."065 However, the states have been unwilling to adopt the
Uniform Rules' proposal without further assurances of adequate trust-
worthiness. Consequently, the California study recommended the addition
of a finding of spontaneity, 6 while New Jersey enacted a version which
would require that the statement have been made "in reasonable proximity
to the event [perceived] and without opportunity to deliberate or fabri-
cate." 17 However, both additions are merely consistent with the common-
law assumption of trustworthiness; neither considers the possibility that
the excitement might have dulled the declarant's senses.68  To give the
accused an adequate substitute for his right to confrontation, the judge
should be required to make this additional investigation.
C. Statements Against Interest
A third exception based upon assumptions about human nature is the
admission of statements against the declarant's interest. Thus, if the wit-
ness is unavailable,6 9 such prior statements may be admitted at trial 70
on the theory that men do not normally state facts against their interest
unless they are true.71 For many years this exception had been restricted
63 Cf. Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
64UNrFORm RULE OF EviDENc E 63(4) (b); accord, Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 303,
§ 60-460(d) (2) ; UTAH STUDY 35.
5 CAL. STUDY 466; cf. McCoRmrCK § 257, at 554.
66 CAr. STUDY 317-18; 1963 N.J. REPORT 146.
67 N.J. Sup. CT. R. EVIDENCE 63 (4) (b).
W See Quick, supra note 10, at 210.09 But see People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 875-76, 389 P.2d 377, 381-82, 36
Cal. Rptr. 841, 845-46 (1964).
70 See generally 5 WIGMORE §§ 1463, 1465.
71 See id. § 1457. See generally Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAND.
L. REv. 451 (1952).
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to facts against pecuniary interest.72 Recently, courts have realized that
there is no rational distinction between statements against pecuniary and
penal interests in their probabilities of trustworthiness and have thus ad-
mitted both types of statements.78
Although it seems reasonable that no man would state a fact which
might cause him to suffer financial loss or imprisonment, the Constitution
must protect defendants from statements of unreasonable men if there is
to be no opportunity for cross-examination. The underlying theory of
reliability seems to presuppose the unlikely factual situations in which
people are conscious of the ultimate legal implications of their speech. This
exception also fails to recognize motives which may cause people to make
unfavorable statements about themselves. Since the declarant is not avail-
able, the accused cannot effectively probe the truth of the remark or the
reasons, however tenuous, for making it. Thus, if the defendant can
present persuasive evidence rebutting the trustworthiness of the statement,
such as declarant's lack of knowledge of the facts, or an attack on the
underlying assumption, such as a motive which may have caused declarant
to fabricate, the hearsay should be excluded.
In this area the Uniform Rules expanded the common law to admit
statements which "so far subjected [the declarant] . . . to civil or
criminal liability" at the time of their assertion "that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true." 7 4 Both the Utah and California studies recommended the addition
of the common-law requirement of unavailability of the declarant.75 Al-
though this addition would supply the essential finding of necessity, it does
not approach the fundamental problem of finding reliability upon unproved
theories of motivation.7" In response to this difficulty, New Jersey has
restricted the exception's use in criminal trials to those which were made
by the defendant.77 As limited, the exception raises no confrontation
problems because of the presence of the defendant at the subsequent trial.
72 See Sussex Peerage Case, [1844] 11 Cl. & F. 109, 111-12, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034,
1044-45.
73 See, e.g., Mason v. United States, 257 F.2d 359 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 831 (1958); People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 875, 389 P.2d 377, 381,
36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1964); Band's Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Borough of Fair
Lawn, 62 N.J. Super. 522, 561, 163 A.2d 465, 486 (App. Div.), certification denied,
33 N.J. 387, 164 A.2d 849 (1960) (extended at least when a public statute is being
challenged). Compare Commonwealth v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d 436
(1949) (declaration against interest of third party which exculpates defendant held
inadmissible), with Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273-77 (1913) (exculpat-
ig confession held inadmissible). In Donnelly Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting,
pointed out that an inculpating dying declaration would be held admissible. Id.
at 278.
74 UNiFoRm RuLE OF EvInENcE 63(10); accord, Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 303,
§60-460 (j).
7
5 CAi. STUDY 323; UTAH: STUDY 37. But see CAL. STUDY 501.
76 But see McCoRmIcx § 257, at 554, stating that these declarations are "just
as credible as [declarant's] present testimony would be."
77 N.J. Sup. CT. R. EVIDE!NCE 63(10). Compare 1963 N.J. REpoRT 168.
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D. Conspiracy
The out-of-court statement of a co-conspirator implicating the defend-
ant has been held admissible when made during the course of a conspiracy,
irrespective of whether the defendant was present when the statement was
made or of whether the declarant is available at trial.78 Although the
courts impose the additional requirement that the statement must have been
made in furtherance of the conspiracy,79 such statements may be admitted
even if a conspiracy was not formally charged,80 subject only to the condi-
tion that the conspiracy be proved by direct evidence.81 Even if the jury is
accurately charged to ignore the statement until it finds a conspiracy
and then to consider the hearsay in deciding whether the defendant was a
participant, the defendant is inadequately protected because such a complex
analysis would seem realistically beyond the jurors' abilities.
82
'The admission of a co-conspirator's hearsay statements subject to
later "tying up" may perhaps be justified by the difficulties in proving
conspiracy.83 But even if the jury is able to comply with the charge, the
defendant's guilt may in fact be determined on the basis of hearsay evidence.
Most courts make no independent analysis of the reliability of such state-
ments.84 In Delaney v. United States 8 5 the Supreme Court held that the
right of confrontation was not violated by the admission of hearsay state-
ments made in furtherance of a conspiracy by a co-conspirator, apparently
without considering the trustworthiness of or necessity for the evidence.
The Court relied upon several prior conspiracy cases which had not posed
78 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); United States v.
Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Mesarosh, 223 F.2d
449, 455 (3d Cir. 1955), ree'd and remanded on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
This hearsay exception has long been accepted. See United States v. Gooding,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 460 (1827). See generally WMLrAmS, CRIMINAL LAW
§218 (2d ed. 1961) (suggesting that before the judge decides on the admissi-
bility of the hearsay he should make a preliminary determination of defendant's
guilt); Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MicH. L. REv. 1159 (1954); Note, 62
HAv. L. REv. 276 (1948) ; Note, 25 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 530 (1958). State decisions
follow this formulation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Super. 179,
154 A.2d 57 (1959).
79 See Krulewitch v. United States, supra note 78, at 444; Yokely v. United
States, 237 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1956); Briggs v. United States, 176 F.2d 317,
320 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 861 (1949). Compare United States v.
Hall, 178 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1950) (confession of co-conspirator after conspiracy
ended held inadmissible). See generally McCoi.micK § 245, at 521-25.
80 See United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
81 Id. at 500; Mayola v. United States, 71 F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1934).
82See United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd,
352 U.S. 232 (1957); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932).
88 See Levie, supra note 78, at 1166.
84 Id. at 1163-67.
85 263 U.S. 586 (1924).
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constitutional issues and held that the judge had not abused his discretion
in admitting the statements.5 6
Several analogies have been made to other hearsay exceptions to
justify the admission of a co-conspirator's statement, but the comparisons
are not compelling.87 For instance, initially to consider these statements
as vicarious admissions 88 confuses the relationship among conspirators
with that of principal and agent. The practical considerations which justify
forcing a principal to adopt, for business and evidence purposes, the state-
ments of his authorized agent 89 are not present with a conspiracy, because
its members often lack the power to control or authorize other members'
actions.90 Nor does it follow that because the substantive law of conspiracy
holds one conspirator accountable for all acts during the conspiracy,91
hearsay of one conspirator can be admitted to show that the defendant was
a member of the conspiracy. The confrontation clause cannot be so simply
ignored by establishing through hearsay the basic fact necessary to
justify the admission of hearsay statements under the substantive law of
conspiracy.
92
The fact that the statements are against the interests of the declarant
might be a sufficient rationale for admitting his statements relevant to his
participation in the conspiracy.93 But the assumption that reasonable men
do not say things against their interests does not logically extend the
inference of reliability to a statement against the interest of another person.
As in any other context, the members of a conspiracy might incriminate
s6Id. at 590. In Scline Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110
(1948), which involved no constitutional discussion, the Court stated that as long
as the hearsay is made within the limits of the conspiracy and a conspiracy is shown
"by independent evidence, these inter-office letters and memoranda were admissible
against all conspirators as declarations of some of the associates so far as they were
in furtherance of the unlawful project" Id. at 117. Despite the general language
of the Schine case and the holding of the Delaney case, the Court has attempted
to resist "attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of
conspiracy prosecution." Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957).
However, neither Grunewald nor the authority cited in that case involved con-
frontation considerations.
87 See generally Levie, supra note 78; Note, 25 U. GEIL L. REv. 530 (1958).
Some courts have even used the confusing label of res gestae. See, e.g., United
States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827). See generally 6 WiGMoRE
§ 1745; CAL. StuDy 465.
88 See, e.g., Gambino v. United States, 108 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1939).
89 See United States v. Miller, 246 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 905
(1957) (criminal case). See generally 1963 N.J. Rz, oRT 165; Morgan, The
Rationale of Vicarious Admisions, 42 HRV. L. R.Ev. 461 (1929) ; Note, 25 U. CE.
L. REv. 530, 533-34 (1958).
90 See Morgan, supra note 89, at 481; Note, 25 U. CEL L. Rzv. 530, 535 (1958).
91 See Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 702 (1926). See also Hetland, Adinissions in the Uniform Rides: Are
They Necessary?, 46 IowA L. REv. 307, 328-29 (1961).
92 See Ganbino v. United States, 108 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1939); Van Riper v.
United States, 13 F.2d 961 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926). See generally
Note, 25 U. CHL L. REv. 530, 539 (1958). Compare Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47, 56 (1898).
93 See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
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other individuals either because of revenge or mistake.9 4  Furthermore,
the conspiracy situation may provide strong motivation to fabricate with
regard to the involvement of innocent parties if the claim of their participa-
tion would further the group's ends. Thus this exception must stand on
its own justification-which seems simply to be that the secret nature of
conspiracy or any joint endeavor necessitates the admission of this evidence.
However, the difficulties of proving conspiracy should not justify the
abrogation of the right to confrontation.
In light of the lack of an independent rationale or of an adequate
substitute for cross-examination to test the truthfulness of a co-conspirator's
statements, it might be doubted whether their admission would be con-
stitutional. However, the Constitution would be satisfied if the judge
were to make an independent finding of reliability based on the specific
case.95 But the scope of review of such a determination should not be
confined by the rubric of trial judges' "discretion." 96
The Uniform Rules broadened the conspiracy exception to admit
statements "relevant" to the conspiracy or its subject matter made while
the "party and declarant were participating in a plan to commit a crime
or a civil wrong" and before its termination9 7 Both the California and
New Jersey commissions feared the unfairness of the sweep of this rule
and restricted it to statements made in furtherance of the plan.0s And
according to the California recommendation, independent proof must be
made of the existence of the conspiracy and participation by the declarant
and the defendant before the declarations may be admitted.9 9 These
additions would not seem to relieve the doubt about the trustworthiness
of these statements. Finally the Uniform Rules' virtual abandonment of
any necessity factor by the elimination of the unavailability requirement
would seem to make this exception constitutionally unacceptable without
further qualification.
E. Prior Testimony
Some hearsay statements are admitted on the grounds that the
defendant had a prior opportunity to test the reliability of the statement
94 See generally Levie, supra note 78, at 1172 ("lies and gossip spread during
the course of a criminal scheme"). The author also suggests that hearsay during
the pendency of the conspiracy should be excluded if the declaration is self-serving.
Ibid.
95 Compare United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd,
352 U.S. 232 (1957).
9 6 Compare text accompanying note 86 supra.
9 7UIFORm RUI.E oF EVIDEC E 63(9) (b); accord, Kan. Laws 1963, cl. 303,
§ 60-460(i) (2); UTAH STUDY 37. The Uniform Rules would also require that the
statement, if it had been made in court, would have been admissible. This require-
ment is not based upon the confrontation clause, but arises from considerations which
would not allow a rule of public policy, such as the exclusion of privileged state-
ments, to be defeated by calling the evidence an exception to the hearsay rule.
98 CAL. STUDY 321; 1963 N.J. REPORT 164 (followed in N.J. Sup. CT. R. EVIDENCEl
63(9) (b)).
99 CAL. STUDY 321.
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by cross-examining the declarant 0 0 on a similar issue.10 1 Thus depo-
sitions ' 0 2 and testimony given at preliminary hearings 0 3 or at prior
trials "D4 will normally be admitted under this rationale. The necessity
for the use of the hearsay is assured by a further requirement that the
witness must be dead, or, if alive, must not be within the jurisdiction of
the court.
0 5
Several decisions based upon the right to confrontation have been
rendered concerning this type of hearsay. 0 6 While the reasoning of these
cases is often unenlightening, 0 7 the fact that the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine supports the holdings that these statements
may be constitutionally admitted. It is, of course, true that the jury is
unable to consider the demeanor of the declarant in assessing the credibility
of his testimony. But with a prior opportunity to cross-examine, the de-
fendant may reveal faults in the memory and perception of the witness or
uncover his personal motivations, all of which may indicate the unreliability
of his statements. Under the analysis presented in this Note, the defend-
ant's ability to show these weaknesses by independent impeaching evi-
dence would not indicate that other hearsay statements, such as spontaneous
declarations, should be admitted if the defendant has impeachment evidence.
With prior testimony the fact that declarant himself has explained contra-
dictions or clarified ambiguities in his testimony closely approximates
100 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Coppedge v. United
States, 311 F.2d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963);
State v. Head, 91 Ariz. 246, 371 P.2d 599 (1962); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1879) (dictum). Compare Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d 516
(5th Cir. 1955) (example of prior testimony which does not raise confrontation
problems in a subsequent perjury suit). See generally 5 WiGMoRE § 1398(1).
101 State v. Kenstler, 49 S.D. 551, 207 N.W. 535 (1926). Compare Shaw v.
United States, 1 F.2d 199, 201 (8th Cir. 1924).
'0 2 See generally 5 WIGMORE § 1398, at 140 n.5; Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 356
(1961). When the Government is to take a deposition, it must give the defendant
sufficient notice of when it is to take place. Compare United States v. French,
117 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1902) ; FED. R. CaRn. P. 15(e).
103 See State v. Tyler, 187 Kan. 58, 353 P.2d 801 (1960) (dictum); cf. State
v. Ortego, 22 Wash. 2d 552, 157 P.2d 320 (1945) (testimony given at a Justice
of the Peace's hearing where no actual record was kept). Compare Fotie v. United
States, 137 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1943) (defendant absent from the preliminary
hearing).
104 McBride v. State, 368 P.2d 925 (Alaska 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 811
(1963) ; State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922
(1958).
105 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Motes v. United States,
178 U.S. 458 (1900) (by implication). It is generally considered the prosecutor's
responsibility to conduct a diligent search for the witness. See West v. Louisiana,
194 U.S. 258 (1904); People v. Redston, 139 Cal. App. 2d 485, 293 P.2d 880
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 175 N.E. 718
(1931) (excellent review of the common-law history of this exception). Compare
White v. Dowd, 164 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Ind. 1958); State v. Brown, 181 Kan.
375, 312 P.2d 832 (1957) (examples of insufficient proof of unavailability). If
the declarant is not absent through the negligence of the prosecution, the admission
of his testimony does not violate the confrontation clause. See Motes v. United
States, supra. See generally 1963 N.J. REPORT 145.
106 See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
107 E.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
758 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the defendant's opportunities were the declarant present at trial. The
resulting high assurance of reliability would seem to provide adequate pro-
tection for the defendant.
However, the generally reliable nature of prior testimony should not
relieve the trial judge of protecting the defendant against potential un-
trustworthiness. In Mattox v. United States,10 8 the Supreme Court,
employing the common denominator of the dying declaration exception, 10 9
upheld the admissibility of prior testimony, although the defendant was
prohibited from impeaching the dead witness' testimony because he had
not laid a proper foundation at his first trial." 0  However, it seems un-
justifiable to deny the defendant the right to impeach the hearsay testi-
mony. If the defendant is denied his right to cross-examine the witness
at trial, he should be permitted to present to the jury the same evidence,
relevant to its determination of the weight to be given the hearsay state-
ment, that he would have been able to present if the declarant had been
actually present. Similarly, if the defendant uncovers new evidence bearing
upon the credibility of the declarant, the judge should determine whether
the trustworthiness of the prior testimony has been so impaired that it
would be unreasonably prejudicial if the defendant were denied the right
to question the declarant before the jury."'
On the other hand, the question remains whether the trial judge's
independent consideration of the reliability of hearsay statements may
properly result in the admission of prior testimony, even where the de-
fendant did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine. In Young v.
United States,"2 which held that the introduction of the witness' grand
jury testimony as probative evidence while the witness was on the stand
at the trial violated the defendant's right to confrontation, the court em-
phasized that the defendant had not been able to cross-examine the witness
108 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
109 The Court stated that "no one would have the hardihood at this day to
question" the admissibility of the dying declaration. Id. at 243.
110 Compare UNIFORm RULE OF EViDENcE 65.
The Supreme Court had reversed Mattox's first conviction. Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892). In the instant Mattox case the Court stated that
the general rules, such as the right to confrontation, "however beneficient in their
operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations
of public policy and the necessities of the case." 156 U.S. at 243. And the Court
continued:
[T]o say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of
a . . . witness, should go scott free simply because death has closed the mouth
of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to a unwar-
rantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public
shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be pre-
served to the accused.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
1"1 In Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 946 (1963), the court prevented the defendant from rebutting the prior
testimony by a signed recantation because of the requirements of authentication of
documents. The procedure of authentication should perhaps be liberalized in these
hearsay situations.
32 214 F2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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at the grand jury hearing." 3 But where the witness is unable to remember
the facts presented in his prior testimony, the record may be admitted if
the court finds that the testimony was given under such circumstances as
to insure its trustworthiness." 4 Under these circumstances the defendant
can probe the witness himself as to motivation to fabricate and his general
perception.
Another consideration which should be determinative of the admis-
sibility of prior testimony is the identity of parties and issues at the prior
hearing. In Kirby v. United States,"5 the Supreme Court held that the
admission of the record of the trial at which defendant's alleged accom-
plices were convicted to prove the existence of the crime was constitu-
tionally impermissible."n Although the interest of the defendant on this
issue was identical to the interests of the defendants at the prior trial, the
confrontation clause would seem to require that a defendant not be bound
by the adequacy of the representation of another party. Even if the de-
fendant had been a party to the prior proceeding, the courts should also
require that the issues in the two proceedings be similar. Cross-examina-
tion on an issue not in the trial may not only be tactically dangerous, but
it would undoubtedly be held to be irrelevant." 7  Yet the Commissioners
did not see fit to impose any identity-of-parties requirement in the Uniform
Rules' exception for depositions and prior testimony, despite the obvious
abridgment of the right to confrontation." 8 The states which have con-
sidered the Uniform Rules' proposal have either questioned the constitu-
tionality of this exception or taken moves to avoid the issue. The Utah
Commission's notes to this exception state that no exception is designed to
violate the constitutional right to confrontation," 9 and the Kansas enact-
13 See People v. Hobson, 369 Mich. 189, 194, 119 N.W2d 581, 584 (1963)
(dissenting opinion) (admission of police memoranda as substantive evidence when he
could not recall facts was thought to violate the state confrontation clause because
the witness could not be effectively cross-examined and the memoranda had no pro-
tective characteristics of trustworthiness).
114 See Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1133, 1164 (1964) (suggestion that when grand
jury proceedings where the defendant has no right to cross-examine were conducted
several years after the events, they may be used to refresh the witness' memory,
but not as past recollection recorded). But see UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(1).
115 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
116 See Barone v. United States, 205 F.2d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 1953).
117 Compare State v. Kenstler, 49 S.D. 551, 207 N.W. 535 (1926) ; Miles v. State,
268 P.2d 290, 298 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1954) (dictum) (defendant waived his
confrontation right when he offered part of the prior civil testimony in a subsequent
criminal trial). In Graham v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 324 (1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 917 (1957), the Court of Claims held that the testimony given at a court-
of-inquiry was constitutionally admissible at a subsequent court-martial even though
the incentive to defend oneself might not be as great at a court-of-inquiry. Although
it might be doubted whether the incentives to defend are in fact different because of
the possible damaging effect on a military career resulting from a court-of-inquiry,
the defendant actually had an opportunity to cross-examine which he should have
exercised as effectively as possible. Accord, Narum v. United States, 287 F.2d 897
(Ct. Cl. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 848 (1961).
11s UNIFORm RuLE OF EVIDENCE 63(3) (the deposition must be taken according
to state law).
119 UTAH STUDY 35.
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ment states that "the provision [of this exception] shall not apply in
criminal actions if it denies the accused the right to meet the witness face to
face . . . . " 1 Both the New Jersey tentative adoption 121 and the
California recommendation 12 met the issue positively and restricted the
use of former testimony by the prosecutor in criminal trials to instances
when the present defendant was a party to the prior proceedings and had
the opportunity for cross-examination with an interest and motive similar
to that of the subsequent proceeding. Leaving aside the constitutionally
necessary identity-of-parties requirement it is interesting to note that
this exception has evoked more constitutional discussion on the part of the
revisors than any other,m yet it is the only exception where there has at
least been a confrontation.
F. Prior Judgments
The instances of using prior judgments in subsequent criminal trials
will be few, except in the habitual criminal situation,124 because criminal
charges are normally joined and criminal trials normally precede civil
trials3m The introduction of a prior judgment in a subsequent criminal
trial poses a possible violation of the defendant's right to confrontation.126
Such evidence is hearsay when it is offered to prove the truth of an element
contained in the judgment which the defendant cannot presently cross-
examine. 2 7 The judicial policy of putting an end to litigation over the
I o Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 60-460(c).
121 N.J. Sup. CT. R. EvIDENCE 63(3).
2 CAL. STUDY 314-15 recommends the division of this exception into two sub-
sections: 63(3), former testimony offered against a party to the former proceeding;
and 63(3.1), former testimony offered against a person not a party to the former
proceeding. Both CAL. STUDY 450 and 1963 N.J. REPORT 139-45 contain extended
discussion as to the applicability of the right to confrontation to this hearsay excep-
tion. The New Jersey study concludes by doubting its constitutionality if applied
to other than the original parties.
12 Even the Uniform Rules Commissioners raised this doubt See UNIFoRM
RUmE OF EviDENcE 63(3), comment.
124 Some state legislatures have determined that two or more convictions char-
acterize a criminal as habitual. But these statutes do not really raise a significant
confrontation problem, for a copy of the judgment would seem to offer few oppor-
tunities for inaccuracies. The judgment itself is being offered into evidence at the
second trial simply to show that the defendant had been convicted, which would
not affect the conviction at the second trial, against which the defendant has a com-
plete chance to defend. It would, however, affect the sentencing. See, e.g., State v.
Johnson, 194 Wash. 438, 78 P.2d 561 (1938). See generally Note, 46 IowA L. REv.
400, 410-11 (1961).
125 See 46 IowA L. Rxv. 400, 412 (1961). But see United States v. Konovsky,
202 F.2d 721, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1953) (submission of a civil judgment into a criminal
trial held unconstitutional).
126 Judgments entered into evidence in subsequent civil trials raise no confronta-
tion issue, but a prior judgment might still be excluded on straight evidentiary prin-
ciples. See, e.g., Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112
S.E. 301 (1922) (larceny conviction in subsequent suit to recover goods). See gen-
erally Cowen, The Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civil Pro-
ceedings, 40 CAIF. L. REv. 225 (1952).
127 See generally 5 WIGMoRE § 1671(a) ; Note, 46 IowA L. Rxv. 400 (1961).
Compare CAL. STUDY 540: "the statement of a jury embodied in its verdict is sid
generis," standing "apart from other kinds of written and oral statements."
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subject matter and the defendant's prior opportunity to defend himself
might be used to justify this exception to the hearsay rule.' 8 By analogy
to the above discussion on prior testimony, if the prior party was someone
other than the present defendant, acceptance of the former judgment-
even assuming an equal motivation for the first party to defend-would
deny to the present defendant that guarantee which belongs only to him.M'
Furthermore, the defendant should always be permitted to offer evidence
to rebut the effect of the judgment. 13 0
The confrontation guarantee would probably be satisfied if the present
defendant had an adequate opportunity and incentive to defend himself on
an identical issue in a prior criminal trial. Under these circumstances
litigation of the issues would have provided the first jury with all that
the second jury would have. 131 If the prior judgment was rendered in a
civil case, however, it should not be admitted in a criminal case because
of the danger that a jury may overemphasize its probative value by not
comprehending the less rigorous burden of proof. Moreover, the pres-
sures to settle or compromise a civil action are so great, especially where
the damages are likely to be inconsequential, that it would be unreasonable
to consider the defendant's previous presentation as an adequate substitute
for his present right to confrontation.
132
Similar doubts about the constitutionality of admitting a prior judg-
ment would arise if the first trial had been for a minor criminal offense,
such as many traffic or nuisance violations, x33 where the defendant might
have pled guilty to avoid further expenses of litigation. Where the prior
judgment is entered upon a guilty plea, the probative weight of the evidence
depends upon assumptions similar to those underlying the declarations-
against-interest exception,' 3 4 rather than upon an earlier jury's weighing
of fully contested evidence. The subsequent death of a traffic-accident
victim, resulting in an indictment for manslaughter, would expose a de-
fendant to a heavy burden of rebuttal if the court admits his guilty-plea
conviction on a prior reckless driving charge. In view of the existence
of motives other than consciousness of guilt which would lead a defend-
ant to enter a guilty plea in these cases, these judgments should not be
used to shift the burden of persuasion.
The formulation of the prior judgments exception in the Uniform
Rules permits the admission of a prior conviction of a felony to prove a fact
essential to sustain the judgment.:'t  The Commissioners realized that they
had gone beyond most common-law rulings in this area and purposely
128 Compare Morrison v. State, 267 Ala. 1, 100 So. 2d 744 (1957).
129 See generally CAL. STUDY 541.
130 The Supreme Court in Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), appeared
more concerned with the conclusiveness of the prior judgment than with its actual
admission.
131 See generally 5 WIGMORE § 1671(a), at 689.
132 Cf. Note, 46 IowA L. Rzv. 400, 412-13 (1961).
133 See 1963 N.J. REPoRT 196-99.134 See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
135 UNioPm RuLE OF EvmENcE 63(20); accord, Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 303,
§ 60-460(r). UTAH S=JY 40.
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limited the exception to felony judgments, where the incentive to defend
presumably would be greatest.1 6 However, they imposed no identity-of-
parties requirement. The New Jersey tentative adoption properly re-
stricted the exception as formulated to subsequent civil trials 13 7-- accepting
its study's suggestion that the "stakes are too high" in a criminal case. 38
California's commission rejected the exception completely, finding no
"pressing necessity" for it, particularly since prior testimony and guilty
pleas could be admissible under other exceptions. 3 9 Although the con-
frontation clause would not require the outright rejection of this exception,
at least not if an identity-of-parties requirement were added, hearsay ex-
ceptions need not be geared to a constitutional minimum.
G. Business Records
If writings or other records were made during the regular course
of business, they may be admitted, without producing the maker of the
records, to prove the facts which they contain. 40 In most jurdisdictions, as
well as in the federal system, this common-law exception has been
codified.141 The necessity for the admission of this evidence is based
primarily on the difficulty, if not impossibility, of establishing many business
occurrences by direct evidence,' 42 for both clerks and top executives cannot
possibly remember every transaction. The trustworthiness justification
is based upon the reliance by businessmen themselves on records made
in the regular course of business procedure or routine.
143
The business records statutes have generally met with judicial
approval.'" Although the exception has been upheld in the criminal
186UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(20), comment.
137 N.J. Sup. CT. R. EvmzNcE 63 (20).
188 1963 N.J. REPORT 197.
'39 CAL. STUDY 331. In a further study it was suggested that the Uniform
Rules should be limited to prior judgments against the present defendant-although
the author of that study did not believe this to be necessary. Id. at 539-41.
140 See generally McCoRmiCx § 286; 5 WIGMORE §§ 1521-33; Laughlin, Business
Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. Rxv. 276 (1961).
141 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1732-33 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1732(b)
(Supp. V, 1964); UNiFoRm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(13). See generally 1963 N.J.
REPORT 177-88; Laughlin, supra note 140, at 276-77, 305.
142 See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 112 n.3 (1943).
143 See Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 413-14 (5th Cir. 1954); 1963
N.J. REPORT 179-80; Laughlin, supra note 140, at 277. But see Orfield, The Hear-
say Rule in Federal Criminal Cases (pt. 2), 32 FORDHAm L. REv. 769, 771 (1964).
If the court finds that the records were not made within the regular course of
business, they will be excluded. See, e.g., United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266
(2d Cir. 1941) ; McKnight v. Broedell, 212 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mich. 1962). Compare
Bisno v. United States, 299 F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 952
(1962) (mere fact that memorandum was taken from chronological files and was in
form of letter does not detract from reliability).
144 See generally Emerson, Business Entries: Their Status Under the Uniform
Rules and Present Law, 26 U. CI NC. L. Rxv. 591 (1957); Polasky & Paulson, Busi-
ness Entries: From Common Law to the New Uniform Rules of Evidence, 4 UTAH
L. REv. 327 (1955).
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context against constitutional objections, 45 civil cases for the most part
provided the background for these decisions.14 6 For example, United States
v. Leathers 147 held that the Federal Business Records Act did not violate
the confrontation guarantee because "records kept as a matter of ordinary
routine are often likely to be more reliable than dying declarations," ' 48
which the court assumed to be constitutional. However, in another case
the admission of records made by a sugar dealer which were required
to be filed with the Internal Revenue Service was held error because they
were neither business nor official records. 14 The court apparently based
its decision upon Palmer v. Hoffian,150 which turned upon whether an
accident report made by defendant's employee was made in the regular
course of business. But, in fact, the court was concerned that the records
did not contain sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. Since this latter
criterion was not a ground for exclusion under the statute,15 ' the court
relied upon a test that was contained therein. The court found that
the federal act itself was constitutional, but, in its analysis of the right
to confrontation, the court said that hearsay must be required by great
necessity and possess "adequate guarantees of trustworthiness ...
[O]therwise . . . Congress could abolish the right of confrontation by
making unlimited exceptions to the hearsay rule." 15 The court's desire
to protect the defendant's constitutional rights is undoubtedly the reason
why the records were excluded on statutory grounds.1t
The admission of business records does not in general offend the
confrontation clause, for the natural motivation to excel in one's endeavor
would normally insure accurate business records.1' However, the fact
145 The Supreme Court has never been forced to decide this issue. For examples
of state decisions, see State v. Guaraneri, 59 R.I. 173, 194 AtI. 589 (1937) (dictum)
(hospital records made within regular course of business not inadmissible because
of the state confrontation clause, which does not alter rules of evidence) ; Waxier v.
State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514 (1950).
146 See United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1943); Olender
v. United States, 237 F.2d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957).
The statutes grew out of the shop-book rule and the regular-entries rule. See 5
WIGmaORE § 1518; Laughlin, supra note 140, at 277-78 & n.3.
147135 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1943).
148 Id at 511.
149 Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954) ; accord, Luttrell v.
United States, 320 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1963). But see State v. Smith, 74 Iowa 580,
38 N.W. 492 (1888) (dictum) (pharmacist's monthly statements to county treated
as official records).
150 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
151 See Orfield, supra note 143, at 771.
152 Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1954).
353 One court in a recent case considered the constitutionality of the federal act
a foregone conclusion. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 225 F. Supp. 61 (E.D.
Pa. 1963). The Government in that case conceded in its memorandum in opposition,
id. at 63 & n.3, that it should always produce the maker of an important record
"wherever possible" because of the sixth amendment. The decision rendered was
probably correct because the issue was posed at a pretrial hearing where no evidence
was before the court.
154 The assumption that reasonable men do not usually make incriminating state-
ments is also included in the justification. See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
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that evidence fits the statutory definition of "business records" should not
of itself determine that it is constitutionally admissible. The reliance upon
records in the business world seems to depend more on the same necessity
which justifies their admissibility at trial, rather than any intrinsic trust-
worthiness of business accounting and reporting systems. Thus, if the
defendant can sufficiently demonstrate to the court that the record may
be unreliable, it should be excluded. Although several of the statutes
provide that such evidence concerning trustworthiness goes only to the
weight to be given the record and not to its admissibility,lss the judge
should be free in a criminal trial to exclude evidence if it appears to him
that the defendant will be significantly prejudiced by not having an
opportunity to cross-examine someone who presently remembers the
transaction. 56
The Uniform Rules qualify the standard business records exception
by requiring the judge to find that "the sources of information from which
[the records were] made and the method and circumstances of their
preparations were such as to indicate their trustworthiness." 17 The great
significance of this formulation is that the defendant's evidence showing
the untrustworthiness of the offered business records is no longer restricted
to the weight to be given the hearsay. Thus the trial judge may exclude
the hearsay when its trustworthiness does not meet the high standards
demanded by the right of confrontation.
The Uniform Rules require no finding of unavailability, apparently
because of the belief that facts recorded soon after the occurrence of an
event will be more accurate than testimony at trial. However, the
California study correctly recommended that the custodian of the records
must testify as to their identity and mode of preparation.'55 In view of
the importance to the defendant of showing the unreliability of the record,
he should not have the burden of finding and producing the proper wit-
nesses. The Constitution would seem to require some showing of extreme
inconvenience or impossibility in not producing the maker of the records
to give direct testimony-particularly when the records are essential to the
prosecution's case.'59
H. Official Records
When writings or reports of public officials are made under official
authority, they will normally be admitted as probative evidence without
15 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
156 Cf. Laughlin, supra note 140, at 295-96.
1
57 UIFoa RULE oF EVIDENCE 63(13); accord, Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 60-
460(m) ; N.J. Sup. CT. R. EVIDENCE 63(13); UTAH STUDY 38. Uxnlovm RULE oF
EVIDENcE 62(6) includes, within the definition of "business," organizations conducted
for nonprofit Compare CAl. STUDY 326, which includes this definition within its
proposed exception.
See 1963 NJ. REPORT 180-88 for an excellent discussion of the various factual
situations which might arise under this exception.
158 CAL. STUDY 326.
159 Cf. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 225 F. Supp. 61, 63 (E.D. Pa.
1963). If the makers were required to take the stand, they could always refresh
their memory with the writing. UNIFoRm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(1).
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production of the original maker being required.1 0° The necessity for
this exception is usually expressed in terms of the inconvenience to certain
officials and the resulting general disruption of public business;16 1 the
assurances of trustworthiness derive from the official's responsibility to the
public to make accurate records 12 and the public's opportunity to correct
mistakes.16 Although courts have in general held this exception con-
stitutional,'6 the mere label of "official record" should not eliminate the
need for a strict appraisal of the truthfulness of the record.
The momentous events of a man's life, birth, marriage, and death are
officially and publicly recorded,:es and so it is not constitutionally unrea-
sonable to produce these documents to prove the facts stated therein rather
than a doctor or minister whose memory may have failed. 6 However,
when the record is not open to public inspection, when there is no duty
to report, or when the report is too evaluative' 67 the accused might be
denied his right to confrontation. Should the accused in a murder trial
whose defense is suicide be forced to have the coroner's report that death
resulted from homicide admitted without an opportunity to cross-examine
its maker on the reasons for his conclusion? ' 68 Even with an official's lack
of motivation to falsify, the introduction of his out-of-court opinions 'a-
as opposed to his routine recordation of facts-raises crucial questions of
memory, perception, and method of analysis. If the defendant can ade-
160See generally 5 WiGmORE §§ 1630-84; 1963 N.J. REPORT 188-92; Wallace,
Offlcial Written Statements, 46 IowA L. REv. 256 (1961).
101 See, e.g., State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 131 Atl. 429 (1925) ; Commonwealth
v. Coldsmith, 176 Pa. Super. 283, 106 A.2d 649 (1954); T'Kack v. United States,
242 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1957) (alternative holding); Olender v. United States, 210
F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
162 See Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113, 125-26 (9th Cir. 1935).
1 63 See United States v. Elder, 232 Fed. 267 (W.D. Ky. 1916); Sturla v.
Freccia, 5 App. Cas. 623 (1880). Compare 5 WIGMORE § 1634.
164 See, e.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 825 (1958) (blood analysis in a drunken driving case); Bracy v. Common-
wealth, 119 Va. 867, 89 S.E. 144 (1916) (chemist's report in an illegal sale of
liquor case) ; People v. Dolgin, 415 Ill. 434, 114 N.E.2d 389 (1953) (Department of
Revenue reports). See 5 WimoRa § 1398, at 141 n.8 which cites Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), as upholding the constitutionality of this excep-
tion. But the Dowdell case only holds that the trial judge and clerk, whose certifi-
cation to the Philippine Supreme Court on how the trial was conducted, were not
witnesses against the accused within the meaning of the sixth amendment. See
generally Wallace, supra note 160, at 272. See State v. Wilson, 141 La. 404, 75 So.
95 (1917), in which a state statute providing that a certificate from the Internal
Revenue Service that a person was issued a federal permit was prima facie evidence
that he violated state licensing law was held to violate the confrontation right.
165 See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 495, 28 N.W.2d 665 (1947) (birth cer-
tificate); cf. Phelan v. United States, 249 Fed. 43 (9th Cir. 1918) (baptismal
record). Compare Austin v. United States, 208 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1953) (death
certificate not admissible on identity of deceased); State v. Green, 161 La. 620,
109 So. 143 (1926) (use of a death register certificate to show death violates con-
frontation right when it could be shown orally).
166 Cf. 1963 N.J. REPORT 189. On statements recorded by ad hoc officials, see
Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 417 n.3 (5th Cir. 1954).
167 See 1963 N.J. REPORT 192.
168 Cf. 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 158 (1952).
169 See State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 520, 131 At. 429, 431 (1925).
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quately demonstate to the court that an effective cross-examination might
sufficiently challenge this testimony, it would seem that the confrontation
clause requires that the evidence be excluded.
Under the Uniform Rules reports or findings of fact made by public
officials are admissible if the official had a duty to make the report, and if
it was his duty "(a) to perform the act reported, or (b) to observe the
act, condition or event reported, or (c) to investigate the facts concerning
the act, condition or event and to make findings or draw conclusions based
on such investigation." 170 In light of the constitutional objections to the
admission of evaluative reports, 171 it is unfortunate that the Commissioners
expanded the common-law exception, especially where a conclusion is
not based upon first-hand information, to include such evaluative state-
ments. Perhaps in response to objections based upon the declarant's right
to confrontation, the various state studies have significantly limited the
exception's scope. The Utah study excluded traffic accident reports
entirely and specifically limited the use of the admissible writings to the
factual data contained therein.172 Similarly, the New Jersey tentative
adoption limited the use of the reports based upon investigation to their
statistical findings.178 Kansas did not adopt this exception at all.
The California study discarded the Uniform Rules' formulation and
recommended that reports be admitted if, in addition to the normal duty
requirement, the judge finds that the record was made soon after the time
of the act or event, and that the sources of information and method of
preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness. 174 The comments
indicate that this modification was designed to allow evaluative reports.175
However, the judge's finding of trustworthiness, in this instance, would
seem to take no account of ill-considered conclusions by the official or
defects in perception in his sources of information, and thus would not meet
the necessary confrontation standards.
I. "Necessity"--U-niform Rule 63(4)(c)
In another effort to unchain the hearsay rule, the Uniform Rules
established a virtually new exception entitled "necessity," which had its
only basis in several statutes allowing hearsay in civil trials if the
declarant had died.176 Thus statements are admissible when made by a
1 7 0 UNIFOPm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (15).
171 The Uniform Rules would require that a copy of the evaluative report be
delivered to the defendant before trial at the risk of exclusion. UNIFORM Rur OF
EVIDENCE 64.
1 72 UTAr STuny 38-39.
173 NJ. Sup. CT. R. EvIDENcE 63(15).
174 CAL. Szrmy 327-28.
17 See id. at 328.
176 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 65 (1956); R.I. Gmri. LAws ANN.
§ 9-19-11 (1956) (no limitation to civil cases, but there appear to be no reported
criminal cases) ; Evidence Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 28. Compare MoDE. CODE OF
EVMENCE rule 503(a) (unavailability is only test for admission of hearsay), criticized
in Gard, The Uniform Rules of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REv. 19, 23-25 (1956).
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
declarant who is unavailable, "narrating, describing or explaining an event
or condition which the judge finds was made by the declarant at a time
when the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his recollec-
tion was dear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of
the action." 177 In the comment to this exception, the Commissioners
emphasize that it was so drafted "to indicate an attitude of reluctance and
require most careful scrutiny in admitting hearsay statements under its
provisions." 178 Several recent civil decisions, apparently following the
spirit of this section, have relied upon the "necessity" of the case for the
probative use of hearsay.1 79
In their appraisal of this exception, the states were primarily concerned
with protection of the defendant's constitutional rights. 8 0 New Jersey's
adoption, in fact, restricted further its study's recommendation that the ex-
ception be applied only to civil cases, by permitting such hearsay in civil
cases only when the declarant is dead.""' The California commissioners
recommended its rejection, presumably, however, because of a fear of abuse
in personal injury cases.'82 The Utah study recommended adoption only
if the statements were restricted to writings.'8 And Kansas adopted the
exception, but required an additional finding by the judge that the declarant
had "no incentive to falsify or to distort." 184 While such a finding would
seem to be encompassed by the notion of "good faith," this specific require-
ment further cautions the trial judge to provide an adequate substitute for
the accused's confrontation guarantee.
This new exception provided by the Uniform Rules has been both
approved 8 5 and criticized' 88 by authorities who have considered its
potential effect upon the right to confrontation. One commentator, who
has questioned the constitutionality of the "necessity" exception, was par-
ticularly critical of the complete lack of an objective indication of trust-
worthiness. 8 7 Clearly, a test which would allow the whims of a judge to
17 7 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(4) Cc). For a liberal definition of "unavail-
able as a witness," see UNiFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 62(7).
1 78 UNiFoRm RULE OF EViDENcE 63 (4), comment.
179 E.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961) (necessity equated with probative value of and lack of accepted category
for the hearsay-an old newspaper); Moore v. Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc., 105 Ga.
App. 70, 84, 123 S.E.2d 693, 702 (1961); Band's Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Borough
of Fair Lawn, 62 N.J. Super. 522, 557-61, 163 A.2d 465, 484-86 (App. Div.), cer-
tification denied, 33 N.J. 387, 164 A.2d 849 (1960).
180 See, e.g., N.J. REPORT 148-53. The commissioners were also worried about the
"practical wisdom" of applying this exception to criminal cases. Id. at 151.
181 N.J. Sup. CT. R. EviDEjcE 63(32).
182 See CAL. STUDY 318.
183 UTAH STUDY 35.
184 Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 60-460(d).
185 Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule
63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HAv. L. Rxv. 932 (1962); Mc-
Cormick, Hearsay, 10 RuT~aRs L. REv. 620, 624 (1956).
186 Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity, and the Uniform Rules: A Reap-
praisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REv. 204, 214-21 (1960).
187 Id. at 219-24; cf. 1963 N.J. REPoRT 152.
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decide whether cross-examination would be beneficial would not give the
defendant the full protection of confrontation. It may also be argued
that if the constitutionally required determination of trustworthiness can-
not be uniformly applied, then it would be better to exclude the evidence
than have one defendant the victim of a judge's overly liberal view of
hearsay. However, this cynical view of trial judges would seem to ignore
the fact that they have been, or should have been, making independent
determinations whether the reliability of hearsay sought to be admitted
under the established exceptions meets the rigorous constitutional stand-
ards.18 8 Moreover, the trial judge would have the benefit of his past
experience with hearsay in determining trustworthiness of the evidence, as
well as any available studies or investigations on the trustworthiness of
statements made under various fact situations. 8 9 And his determination,
if not encumbered by the "discretion" rubric, will be subject to appellate
review.
Indeed, this exception would seem to provide a more secure safeguard
than reliance upon the traditionally accepted categories. For where a
hearsay exception is readily available, judges often mechanically fit the evi-
dence into an established niche without carefully appraising its credibility.
But recent analysis has revealed that many exceptions are based upon
assumptions about human conduct, 190 often remnants of an earlier era,191
which do not take account of significant factors of unreliability. The new
Uniform Rules' exception is more sensitive to constitutional standards by
requiring a determination whether cross-examination would be necessary to
protect the accused. And it offers the distinct benefit of having the judge
actually pass upon the credibility of the declarant before the jury receives
his statements ' 9=---a basis for exclusion which reflects the primary advan-
tage the defendant obtains when he can confront the witness himself in
front of the jury.
James W. Jennings
' 8 8 The problem of the overzealous prosecutor who might spirit off some of the
witnesses, making them unavailable, would not seem to be as great as it might seem,
for the courts should be able to control this situation by a finding of diligent search.
See note 105 supra.
189 See, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence,
28 CoLU m. L. REv. 432 (1928).
190 See text accompanying notes 46-48, 69-73 supra.
191 E.g., the dying declaration. See also note 31 supra.
1
0
2 See CAl.. STUDY 463. Compare Note, 46 ILL. L. REv. 915 (1952).
